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STATUS OF SECOND MORTGAGES EXECUTED BY
BORROWERS FROM HOME OWNERS' LOAN
CORPORATION
By SAMUEL H. STERLING, of the Denver Bar

T HAS developed that, when the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation was making loans in accordance with the Act
of Congress approved on June 13, 1933, and subsequently
amended, a number of original mortgagees of the borrowers
who obtained loans, took back second mortgages in addition
to the bonds and cash which they received from the Corporation. The validity or effect of such second mortgages has been
the basis of a considerable number of suits brought for cancellation of the lien, or interposed as a defense when used as the
basis for an action.
Among various powers and authorities granted to the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation was the provision that the
Corporation would be "under the direction of the Board and
operated by it under such by-laws, rules and regulations as it
may prescribe for the accomplishment of the purpose and intent of this section." The Act further specifically provided
that, "The Board is authorized to make such by-laws, rules
and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Section, that may be necessary for the proper conduct of the
affairs of the Corporation."
In accordance with the terms of the Act, the Board, from
time to time, promulgated many rules and regulations which
concerned the procedure of taking applications for loans, the
various preliminary phases to making loans, and the final consummation of first liens, coupled with payment to the mortgagee or mortgagees then of record, through the medium of
bonds or cash.
Although the Act did not specifically preclude the execution of a second mortgage by the borrowers to the original
mortgagee, the Board, in its Manual of Rules and Regulations,
passed in accordance with the power or authority conferred by
the Act, did provide that: "The Corporation will not refund
any indebtedness where the mortgagor is required to pay more
than he owes, through agreements either to pay future interest
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to the original mortgagee, or to absorb any loss of interest by
the original mortgagee, or to guarantee any difference between
the face value of the bonds plus accrued interest thereon and
the market value of the same, or to cover any assumed loss on
account of acceptance of the bonds of the Corporation by the
mortgagee. The Corporation will not become a party to any
contract between a mortgagor and mortgagee in reference to
indebtedness refunded by the Corporation." In addition to
this general statement, the Manual further provided that:
"Where the full amount of the indebtedness against the property cannot be refunded by the Corporation, the mortgagee or
other lien holder will be permitted to take a second mortgage
or second deed of trust if the amount of such second mortgage
or deed of trust does not exceed the difference between the Corporation's appraisal and the amount of the Corporation's first
mortgage. In no case shall the second trust or second mortgage to such other mortgagee or lien holder be in terms which
would cause the mortgagor's payments to the Corporation to
be a hardship, or deprive the mortgagor of reasonable opportunity to pay such second mortgage or second trust."
The procedure used by the Corporation was, first, to decide that the applicant was elegible and that the value of the
property permitted the making of a loan, and second, to obtain
the consent of the mortgagee to accept the amount of'bonds or
cash which the Corporation, under its rules, could pay. In
order to satisfy this second requirement, a mortgagee was required to sign an instrument known as "Mortgagee's Consent
to Take Bonds." This consent was addressed to the Corporation, and originally read in part as follows:
"The undersigned is a holder of a first mortgage or other obligation,
which constitutes a lien or claim on the title to the home property of
--- --located at
(Number)
(Street)
(City)
-----------------------------------------in the sum of $
(State)
"Being informed that said owner has made application to Home
Owners' Loan Corporation to refund his said indebtedness, the undersigned has considered the method of refunding mortgages provided in
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933; as passed by Congress and approved
by the President, and the undersigned hereby consents, if said refunding

can be consummated, to accept in full settlement of the claim of the
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----------- face value of the bonds of Home
undersigned the sum of $
Owners' Loan Corporation, to be adjusted with not exceeding $50 cash
as provided in said act, and thereupon to release all the cliam of the undersigned against said property.
"It is understood that you will incur trouble and expense in connection with your effort to refund the indebtedness of said home owner, and
this consent is executed in consideration of the same and shall be binding
for a period of ---------days from date.
193----."
"T his, the ------------- day of ---------------------------,-----

There are several main questions which seem to be involved in determining the legality of a second mortgage which
was taken back by the original mortgagee. The first of these
is whether the Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds, wherein
the mortgagee agreed to accept bonds of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation in full settlement of his claim, operates as a
release in full of the borrower's indebtedness, and the second,
whether the note secured by a second mortgage taken back by
the original mortgagee is void as against public policy.
To determine these questions, the procedure used by the
Corporation in closing its loans must be borne in mind. It
must further be remembered that the Mortgagee's Consent was
executed by him voluntarily, and that prior to the execution
of such Consent, the mortgagee had the choice of resorting to
his legal remedies under the lien which he then held (and which
necessarily had to be delinquent) in settlement of his claim.
He chose, however, to voluntarily sign a Consent and to accept
the bonds in the amount offered to him by the Corporation.
The determination of the question now properly brings
to mind the consideration of whether the consent complies
with the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. An accord is
defined as being "An agreement whereby one of the parties
undertakes to give or perform, and the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim, liquidated or in dispute, and arising either
from contract or from tort, something other than or different
than what he is, or considers himself entitled to; and a 'satisfaction' is the execution of such agreement." (Improved Industrial Order of Wise Men vs. Muskogee Securities National
Bank, 139 Okla. 16, 280 Pac. 1087.)
Ordinarily accord and satisfaction is confined to unliquidated or disputed claims, but it may also apply to liquidated
claims or to liquidated claims not in dispute.
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Assuming that the lien which the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation took over was a liquidated claim, the courts very
generally have approved the principle that if a payment be
made from funds furnished by or derived from another than
the debtor, even though the amount is less than the liquidated
or undisputed claim, it is an accord and satisfaction. ( 1 C. J.,
Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 5 1; 1 RCL, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 28; Peoples Exchange Bank vs. Miller, 139 Kan. 3,
29 Pac. (2) 1079.)
In all cases where the Corporation refunded an indebtedness, there was no dispute between the parties as to the method
of refinancing, and the transaction constituted an absolute
agreement to substitute a different performance for the one
provided by the original paper.
In 1 C. J., Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 60, there is the
statement that:
"The acceptance of bills of exchange or checks of a third person for
a less amount than that due, in satisfaction thereof, operates as an accord
and satisfaction. So the giving and acceptance of an order on a third
person for less than the amount due, which order is duly paid, operates
(Citing cases.)
as an accord and satisfaction."

Further in 1 RCL, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 27, it is
stated that:
"If a debtor gives his creditor a note, check or other security of a
third person for a sum less than the debt and this is received in full satisfaction of the debt, this will constitute a good accord and satisfaction.
This is a clear case of the creditor receiving something to which he was
not entitled by his contract, and which he could not demand." (Citing
cases. )

The adequacy of the consideration, if questioned, is immaterial. 13 C. J. Contracts, Sec. 637, enunciates the principle that:
i "The inadequacy, as has been well said, is for the parties to consider at the time of making this agreement.-

Where the amount received by the original mortgagee was
not liquidated or matured, then, of course, the general proposition is that:
"Where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, payment and accept-

ance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and
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satisfaction, in the absence of fraud, artifice, mistake or imposition.
* * *"
(1 C. J., Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 71.)

It would thus seem to be established that payment by the
Corporation to an original mortgagee in bonds of a total value
less than the sum due the creditor, regardless of whether the
claim was liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured,
such payment by the Corporation and receipt by the original
mortgagee would be sufficient basis for the courts to apply the
doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction.
The second question is whether or not a second mortgage
executed by the borrower to the original mortgagee for a deficiency when refinancing the loan, is void as against public policy. It must be borne in mind that the courts have uniformly
held the Home Owners' Loan Corporation to be a relief agency
and as such, it is to be considered in somewhat of a class by
itself. In Pye vs. Gunart, 275 N. W. 615, the court stated
that:
"The policy announced by the Home Owners' Loan Act is a policy of the United States by which we are bound, and there can be no
question but that the United States can make its prohibition binding
upon others than the technical parties to the loan contract in order to
protect the borrowers. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was created as a relief agency to save the investment of small home owners in
distress by judiciously refinancing their obligations on such homes, and
in connection with the significant purpose of the Act it justifiably prohibited contracts of the nature herein involved."

The principle that a contract is unenforceable which
tends in a marked degree to bring about results sought to be
prevented by an Act of Conaress is found in Sage vs. Hampe,
235 W. S.99, 59 L. Ed. 147:
"A contract that invokes prohibited conduct makes the contractor
a contributor to such conduct. (Citing cases.)
And more broadly, it
long has been recognized that contracts that obviously and directly tend
in a marked degree to bring about results that the law seeks to prevent
cannot be made the ground of a successful suit. (Citing cases.)
It appears to us that this is a contract of that class. It called for an act that
could not be done at the time, and it tended to lead the defendant to
induce the Indian owner to attempt what the law, for his own good,
forbade."

In the case of Chaves County Building and Loan Assn.
vs. Hodges, 59 Pac. (2nd) 671 (New Mex.), a case which
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involved a violation of a Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds,
the court states that:
"It has been held that the courts should take judicial notice of the
fact that the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is strictly a relief agency,
organized to aid distressed home owners in saving their homes. The
reduction in the amount of the home owner's debt (which, of course, can
be accomplished only with the consent of his creditor) is the most effective aid, in most instances, which can be rendered to him. Merely to put
off the evil day of foreclosure would fail to carry out the purposes of the
act. If the debt is more than 80% of the value of the home, creditor
refused to discount his claim, the law afford no remedy. However, the
creditor generally chooses to exchange his lien for a smaller sum in bonds.
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation is interested in the reduction of
the indebtedness of the home owner who procures a loan."
"The exact amount of the indebtedness to be canceled by the acceptance of its bonds and the amount loaned by the creditor on the tendered security are subjects upon which the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is entitled to accurate information; and which we may assume is to
be considered in determining the amount which can be safely loaned to
the home owners."

The case of Cook vs. Donner, 66 Pac. 2nd Series, p. 587
(Kans.), which concerned a second mortgage on property refinanced by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, decided that:
"The Note and Mortgage sued on in this action were out of harmony with the statute and rules authorizing the work of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the release issued thereunder and showed bad
faith, and were against public policy and therefore null and void."

In the Cook case, the court further considered the fact
that certain state officials of the Corporation, and its attorneys,
knew that a second mortgage was going to be executed by the
borrower for the benefit of the original mortgagee, and claimed

that such knowledge would comply with the Corporation's

requirements governing the approval of second mortgages.
Concerning this point, the court stated:
"That the claimed ratification was not effective because of the absolute invalidity of the Note and Mortgage."

In the case of Jessevich vs. Abbene, 277 N. Y. S. 599, the
ruling of the court was against "secret collateral agreements as
violative of the Home Owners' Loan Act." Further stating:
"Collusive agreement between creditor and home owner creating
on the owner-occulied home encumbrances too heavy and terms too se-
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vere for the home owner to work out his problem would easily defeat
the very purpose of this act, interfere by trickery with this Corporation
collecting its bonds, and the government's financial assistance would
merely delay the inevitable foreclosure suit which it meant to prevent.
The second mortgagee would thereby benefit by his own wrong, first, in
being paid by the government the greater part of his second mortgage in
its tax exempt bonds which it guarantees unconditionally both as to
principal and interest; then by getting the defendant's homestead through
foreclosure for the small balance due; and, lastly, by getting the benefit
of the excellent first mortgage thereon, never intended for him."
"This contract calls for an act by the defendant owners which the
law for their own good forbade. The United States can make its prohibitions binding to the extent necessary effectively to carry out its policies.
Sage vs. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99, 35 S. Ct. 94, 59 L. Ed. 147. It is against
the policy of the law to enable either party in controversies between
themselves to enforce an agreement in fraud of the law. Edward Hart
vs. City Theatres Co., 215 N. Y. 322, 109 N. E. 497."

An attempt was made in the Cook v. Donner case to distinguish between a "secret collusive agreement" and one where
the state officials of the Corporation knew that a second mortgage was to be executed. In disposing of this point, the court
stated that "Such agreement would seem to be prohibited
whether they be secret or not."
In the First Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Utica
vs. Speaker, 294 N. Y. S. 831, the plaintiff took a secured note
for the balance allegedly due after refinancing with the Corporation. The court stated:
"We are of the opinion that the taking of the note on which this
suit is based is against public policy and that the note itself is void."

Other cases are: Lyon vs. Adams, 294 N. Y. S. 732;
Westchester Trust Company vs. Beicher, 247 App. Div. Rep.
778 (N. Y.); Meek vs. Wilson, 278 N. W. 731 (Mich.).
Stager vs. Junker, et al., 188 Atl. 440, contains the statement that:
"The Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 128 (see USCA 1461
et seq.), was intended to provide emergency relief with respect to home
mortgage indebtedness, and the rules of the corporation provide that no
loan will be made where there was a separate understanding or agreement
between the debtor and the holder of the mortgage calling for any payments other than those required by the corporation. The plaintiff, in
order to facilitate the loan, stated the full extent of his debt and agreed
to accept a definite number of bonds at face value in full settlement
thereof. He was then precluded from exacting any further or other
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agreement from his debtor looking to the payment of the additionalsum.
The mere fact that he exacted the instrument in suit, while the negotiations were pending and after he had agreed to accept a definite number of
bonds in full settlement, denotes bad faith toward the lending agency.
When he agreed to an acceptance of such reduction of bond interest, the
acceptance related back to the first agreement, and was a reiteration of the
promise there made to accept the bonds agreed upon in full settlement of
the defendant's obligation in accordance with the rules of the lending
corporation deemed necessary to rehabilitate the home owner. By means
of the secret agreement the plaintiff could not defeat the express terms of
his own agreement to accept the bonds of the lending agency in full settlement of the defendants' obligation."

In another recent decision, Anderson vs. Horst, 200 Ati.
721, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, dealing with a second mortgage, stated:
"We are of opinion, therefore, that an agreement between the mortgagee and the home owner, made without the approval of the Corporation, by which the home owner assumes or agrees to pay all :or any part
of the mortgage debt which had been settled and released by the refunding effected by the Corporation is void as against public policy and will
not be allowed to be enforced by the mortgagee."

Finally, assuming that the defense of ratification or subsequent approval is interposed, 13 C. J. 506 (Sec. 452-53)
states that:
"A contract malum in se against public policy cannot be made valid
by ratification. * * * An agreement void as against public policy cannot be rendered valid by invoking the doctrine of estoppel."
. "It is obvious that a contract illegal or against public policy
cannot
be rendered valid by a subsequent ratification."
tracts," Sec. 679.

2 Elliott on "Con-

Although other legal issues may be involved in any particular case, the foregoing is intended merely as a general discussion of the salient points in controversies between original
borrowers and mortgagees as to the validity of second mortgages or deed of trust executed in connection with loans refinanced by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation.

